The states of Kanem and Borno (which flourished from about AD 10) on the shores of Lake Chad were the first imperial states in the region; their wealth was founded on control of trans-Saharan trade routes. From the 11th to 14th centuries the Islamic Hausa city states were also a dominant influence, whilst in the southwest the Yoruba cities of Ife, Oyo and Benin became major trading centres. In the 15th century, the Portuguese began trading – first for spices, later for slaves. The Portuguese were then supplanted by other European trading nations. The slave trade disrupted the balance of power in the region as did, in the 18th century, the southward expansion of the Islamic faith and the arrival of Christian missionaries.

At the end of the 19th century, the British conquered the territory of present-day Nigeria. After World War II, the first step towards decolonisation was the introduction of a federal system of government. A Muslim northerner, Alhaji Abulbakar Tafawa Balewa, became the first prime minister. After a period of internal self-government, full independence from Britain was achieved in 1960. The first post-independence government was a coalition of members of the Northern People’s Congress and the eastern-based National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroon. Since then the country has endured numerous changes of government in which the most important factor has almost always been the influence of the military. Concerned that ethnic and religious differences could split the country apart, the army has chosen to intervene on several occasions to thwart a perceived threat to the integrity of the nation.

The greatest crisis came about in the mid-1960s when the eastern part of the country, styling itself the ‘Republic of Biafra’, attempted to secede. A three-year (1967-70) civil war followed at the end of which the secessionists were defeated and the federal government under General Gowon reasserted control, albeit at a heavy price in lives, especially in the former Biafran territories. Gowon was overthrown by fellow army officers in 1974 led by General Murtala Mohammed, himself assassinated in 1976 and replaced by army chief of staff General Olusegun Obasanjo. The new leader fulfilled the military’s repeated promises to bring about a return to civilian rule. In 1979, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was elected to represent the National Party of Nigeria – a coalition of parties which had existed prior to the twelve-year-long ban on political activity.

Shagari was re-elected for a second term in 1983 but, after a few months, the military – citing mismanagement and corruption on the part of the civilian government – launched another coup under army chief Mohammed Buhari. Rivalries in the armed forces proved to be just as potent as before: Buhari lasted less than two years before being overthrown by General Ibrahim Babangida (who himself survived several attempted coups led by rival army officers). Despite repeated promises to return the country to civilian rule, largely delivered to mollify the international community, nearly a decade passed before elections were held in 1993. Although every possible arrangement was made to ensure that the military’s favoured candidate was elected, the poll was comprehensively won by Moshood Abiola, a former publisher promoted as a token opposition candidate.

Rather than accept his victory, the military annulled the elections and returned the country to military rule. Sani Abacha, a senior aide to the former president Babangida, emerged as the new military strongman and, over the next five years, he presided over an increasingly oppressive regime. Abiola was put under arrest and other opponents of the regime were jailed or exiled. The regime attracted much international criticism through its treatment of the Ogoni people located in the oil-rich southeast of the country. A peaceful campaign of opposition, led by the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa, was violently suppressed by the military and prominent Ogoni leaders, including Saro-Wiwa himself, executed on trumped-up charges. Thereafter the Abacha government suffered increasing diplomatic isolation, much of it orchestrated by President Nelson Mandela of South Africa.

Yet, in the immediate aftermath, the army showed no sign of relinquishing its control over the country. Then, in June 1998, Abacha suddenly died. Another member of the military junta, General Abdulsalam Abubakar took over and moved quickly to shed the country’s pariah status, tackling Nigeria’s now desperate economic situation for the expected elections. These were arranged in the customary fashion with several manufactured parties of broadly centrist persuasion claiming allegiance from geographically based constituencies. The favourite in the presidential campaign, representing the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), was the former military ruler of the 1970s, Olusegun Obasanjo. He won the February 1999 poll with just under two-thirds of the vote.

At the same time, the PDP also secured an absolute majority in both houses of the newly established parliament. The Government has set its immediate priorities as being, firstly, the restoration of Nigeria’s international position, both in Africa and the rest of the world, after years of ostracism and, secondly, tackling the country’s endemic corruption, starting with the recovery of more than US$1 billion stolen by the leaders of previous military governments. However, the process of reversing Nigeria’s chronic economic and political decline will be a far more demanding task, especially for an inexperienced civilian government shadowed by a military establishment all too keen to intervene on any pretext. Although the military has so far remained in their barracks, as of 2001 the Obasanjo government has been struggling to improve Nigeria’s political and economic circumstances.

On the domestic front, the Obasanjo government has also had to deal with growing religious conflict, especially in the northern part of the country. A particular problem has been the decision of several local and regional governments in areas of Muslim majority to introduce a version of Islamic Sharia law. Although it is supposed to apply only to practising Muslims, Christians and others complain of repression. Hundreds were killed in intercommunal clashes in 2000 and again in 2002. These clashes are often set off by the most trivial of disputes. In November 2002, hundreds were killed in the northern city of Kaduna after protests over plans to hold the ‘Miss World’ pageant in Nigeria. There have also been outbreaks over plans to execute (by stoning) a woman found guilty of adultery and over the assassination in December 2001 of the popular Justice minister, Bola Ige, by Islamic militants.